This paper investigates underlying sources of the US entrepreneurial ecosystem's comparative advantage by assessing the benefits Israeli technology startups derive from migrating to the US. To address positive sorting into migration we adopt three complementary approaches, which include examining exogenous institutional constraints on the startups' ability to migrate, estimating a double-LASSO regression, and exploiting within-mover variation of performance outcomes. We show that migrants raise larger funding amounts, become more likely to apply for a trademark and to be acquired than non-migrants. Conditional on an acquisition, migrants also achieve a higher transaction value. However, they hold as many patents as non-migrants. We conclude that the US entrepreneurial ecosystem's comparative advantage vis-?-vis other innovative economies, such as Israel, arises from a multitude of sources producing sizeable gains for startups. These sources are investor availability, a large consumer market, and a developed market for acquisitions.
Introduction
Entrepreneurial ecosystems play a fundamental role in spurring a country's innovation and economic growth (Acs and Armington, 2006; Audretsch, 2007; Akcigit and Kerr, 2018) . However, despite their acknowledged contribution, little is known regarding the factors that are responsible for their success (Bresnahan & Gambardella, 2004) . The United States (US), for example, is reputed for being one of the most successful entrepreneurial ecosystems in the world. While this country hosts the largest number of high-performing startups worldwide, 1 its ranking in terms of level of education and innovation is not as elevated. 2 Yet, domestic education and innovation are considered to be critical inputs to growth entrepreneurship. Therefore, what makes the US so successful? Addressing this question fills a fundamental gap. Many countries have invested considerable resources to try to replicate the US model (Lerner, 2009) . Nonetheless, the foundations of this model are largely unknown.
One reason for the US success could simply be that this country hosts a large number of startups, regardless of the quality of its entrepreneurial ecosystem. Given the skewed distribution of firm success (Gompers and Lerner, 2004) , the greater the number of startups, the higher the likelihood of observing positive performance outcomes. Another possibility is that the comparative advantage of the US entrepreneurial ecosystem arises from a multitude of sources that transcend the country's level of education and innovation. According to the literature, possible sources are a large consumer market (Krugman, 1991) , the availability of specialized inputs (Marshall, 1920) , the presence of investors (Chen et al., 2010) , and a developed market for acquisitions (Arora et al., 2004; Gans and Stern, 2003) . Which of these candidates matter in explaining the US success?
This paper takes a first step towards shedding light on underlying sources of the US entrepreneurial ecosystem's comparative advantage. 3 For this purpose, we employ a dataset of Israeli technology startups and examine their migration to the US. By estimating the different benefits 1 these companies derive from moving to the US, we infer the sources of the US comparative advantage, especially relative to other innovative countries such as Israel. Our empirical context is particularly appealing for a number of reasons. First, a fundamental requirement for assessing the causal effect of migrating to the US is that the rank order of performance in both the source and the destination country are similar (Borjas, 1987) . While no two countries are exactly the same, Israel shares a similar specialization in high-technology industries as the US, thereby making the rank order of performance in these two countries somewhat comparable. Second, Israel has historically built strong ties with the US and Israeli startups regard the US as an attractive destination, thereby making migration a frequent event rather than an outlier (Senor and Singer, 2009 ). Finally, the unique institutional features of the Israeli context provide us with a quasi-exogenous variation in the startup decision to migrate, allowing us to causally identify the effect of migrating on Israeli startups' various performance outcomes.
Building on the Conti (2018) dataset, we examine 2,192 startups, initiated by Israeli entrepreneurs between 1990 and 2014, and investigate their decision to establish their headquarters in the US as well as the performance implications of this decision. Our first set of results documents that migrants exhibit strong positive sorting. Compared to non-migrants, they raise larger amounts of funds during their first financing round, are more likely to attract US venture capitalists (VCs), and are founded by serial successful entrepreneurs. Migrants are also more likely to apply for US granted patents and trademarks in their early years. Supporting our conjecture that the rank order of performance in Israel and the US are similar, we find that Israeli startups with a high predicted likelihood of migrating to the US tend to be successful even when they do not actually migrate.
We next delve into the core of our analysis and investigate the gains Israeli startups may derive from migrating to the US. In particular, we explore six startups' outcome measures that closely map into some of the most relevant benefits we mentioned earlier. Specifically, we first examine whether or not startups apply for a trademark with the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to assess the benefits of penetrating a larger consumer market than the domestic economy. We then analyze the number of US granted patents startups apply for to evaluate the advantages of accessing innovation inputs and R&D spillovers. We also examine the amount of venture capital (VC) raised to gauge the gains startup migrants derive from accessing a relatively large supply of investors.
Finally, we evaluate the likelihood that a startup is acquired and the likelihood it goes public via 2 an IPO, as well as the transaction value in case of an acquisition. These three measures allow us to determine whether startups can extract a higher value from their technologies by accessing a comparatively large market for exits.
Given our earlier results on the positive sorting into migration, the challenge we face is that failure to control for startup heterogeneity biases migration estimates upward. We adopt three complementary approaches to address this concern. First, we implement a quasi-experiment that compares migrants' outcomes to those of startups that, for exogenous reasons, find it costly or cannot migrate. The latter are startups operating in the defense sector and that conduct stem cell research. The defense sector is characterized by high entry barriers (Adams and Adams, 1972) that make it very costly for Israeli startups operating in this sector to migrate to the US market.
Similarly, there are considerable restrictions on embryonic stem cell research in the US as compared to Israel (Furman et al., 2012) reducing the profitability of opening headquarters in the US for startups developing technologies in this field. Second, we implement a double-LASSO regression (Belloni et al., 2014) , which addresses selection bias through an efficient utilization of the observables. Finally, we exploit within-mover variation of performance outcomes and assess the effect of moving to the US in any given year.
The results are consistent across the different approaches. We find that migrants are significantly more likely than non-migrants to apply for a trademark in the US. They are also more likely to raise VC funds and to be acquired. Migrants improve the amount of US VC they raise and the likelihood of being acquired by a US company. However, they do not improve the amount of financing they receive from non-US VCs and their odds of attracting non-US acquirers. Conditional on exiting through an acquisition, startups also achieve a higher transaction value. The positive effects we find are not only statistically significant, but also economically important. For instance, the double-LASSO model predicts that movers are 22 percentage points more likely to apply for a trademark with the USPTO and raise 108% more VC funds than non-movers. Additionally, migrants are 16 percentage points more likely to exit via an acquisition than non-migrants and their transaction value, upon acquisition, is 100% higher. Several of these effects are largest for startups that move their headquarters to the US instead of opening a subsidiary and for those migrating to California, Massachusetts, and the New York area, which are the Israeli migrants' most frequently chosen state destination locations. Remarkably, we do not find any significant migration effect on the likelihood that startups will go public via an IPO, although we show that Israeli migrants substitute domestic IPOs with acquisitions after they move. Similarly, we find that migration produces no significant effect on the number of patents Israeli migrants apply for.
These results reveal that the US entrepreneurial ecosystem's comparative advantage arises from a multitude of sources producing sizeable gains for startups. The sources we identify are a large consumer market, the availability of investors, and a developed market for acquisitions. The insignificant migration effects we find on the startups' patent output do not imply that the availability of innovation inputs and R&D spillovers are irrelevant for the absolute advantage of the US entrepreneurial ecosystem. Rather, this finding suggests that such factors are not as important as the others when specifically comparing the US to other innovative economies. This paper is situated at the intersection of the economic geography and entrepreneurship literatures. The first strand of the literature has highlighted the importance of factors such as market size (Krugman, 1991; Venables, 1996) , access to specialized inputs (Marshall, 1980) , and information spillovers (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996) to explain the clustering of economic activities in certain regions of the world. We transpose these factors into the specific entrepreneurship context and identify those responsible for the relative success of the US entrepreneurial ecosystem and the startups it hosts. In doing so, we build on studies that have investigated the determinants of entrepreneurial clusters (Chinitz, 1961; Saxenian, 1994; Glaeser and Kerr, 2007; Glaeser et al., 2010) to specifically focus on underlying sources of the US entrepreneurial ecosystem's comparative advantage relative to other innovative economies. Our analysis extends the work by Guzman (2018) who has examined the characteristics of startups that migrate within the US and the migration benefits these companies derive. In contrast with this study, we concentrate on the international migration phenomenon using it to infer the specific characteristics of the US entrepreneurial ecosystem. Finally, our results speak to the literature that has analyzed the differences in productivity levels between the US and other countries (van Ark et al., 2008) . In particular, our result that migration produces no significant innovation productivity gains stands in contrast with the findings by Bloom et al. (2012) , who have shown that Americans do IT better. Israel hosts a large pool of highly-skilled individuals, especially in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sectors, which reduces the relative importance of achieving productivity gains as a reason to migrate to the US.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 overviews the features of the Israeli entrepreneurial context. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 documents the selection of Israeli startups into migration. Section 5 discusses the identification strategies we employ to estimate the benefits from migrating to the US and presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Context: Israel, "The Startup Nation"
Israel is one of the most prolific innovative economies, ranked in top positions by several institutions, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Economic Forum. 4 An important fraction of Israeli innovations is produced by domestic technology startups (Bresnahan et al., 2001) . In the past three decades, Israel has given rise to one of the most developed high-technology startup-intensive clusters outside of the US, hosting the largest number of technology startups per capita worldwide. 5 Many of these startups operate in ICT sectors, reflecting Israel's comparative advantage in these areas, although they have recently expanded in industries such as the life sciences (Beyar et al., 2017) . The successful efforts in building a startup ecosystem have earned Israel the title of "Startup Nation" and the area around of Tel Aviv, where most of the startups are concentrated, the name of "Silicon Wadi" (Silicon Valley in English). This success has been largely ascribed to a combination of factors, including the Israeli compulsory military service, a large availability of scientists and engineers, and ad hoc government policies (Trajtenberg, 2000 (Trajtenberg, & 2005 .
Israelis go through several years of military service, which provides them with training in military technologies that can lead to relevant commercial applications, especially in ICT sectors. The technical training Israelis receive is particularly intense in elite army units, such as Unit 8200.
Individuals selected in these units have produced technologies at the forefront of wireless communications, network, the internet, and data security, among others. These elite units are not only responsible for developing their members' technical skills but also for providing them with important business-related experience. Admitted individuals are required to take complete responsibility for their sub-unit organization and manage projects that very much resemble those pursued in high-technology startups (Engel and del-Palacio, 2011) .
While the Israeli Army is crucial in the making of a "Startup Nation", it is not the only factor. Another determinant input is the large availability of scientists and engineers, which results in Israel ranking in top positions for the per capita number of individuals with a STEM degree (Beyar et al., 2017) . The education that renowned research institutions, such as Technion and the Weizmann Institute, provide has largely contributed to the creation of this human capital stock, complementing the role of the Israeli Army. An additional contributing factor is the immigration of approximately 1.6 million Soviet Jews (1/8 of the current Israeli population), which started in the late 1980s, following the dissolution of the URSS. A consistent share of these migrants hold STEM degrees and their skills in STEM disciplines have been recognized to play an important role in the ICT boom Israel experienced in the late 1990s (de Fontenay and Carmel, 2004) .
It is also important to mention the active role the Israeli government plays in sustaining private R&D projects, particularly those undertaken by startups (Trajtenberg, 2000 (Trajtenberg, & 2005 . Among the government initiatives stands the creation of Yozma, a type of venture fund with the scope of stimulating other venture funds. Additionally, the government established a number of hightechnology incubators to absorb the large inflow of educated Russian Jews who typically lacked basic knowledge regarding commercialization practices.
While there is little doubt that Israeli entrepreneurs benefit from domestic R&D spillovers, they operate in a small market, which makes them very sensitive to location choices. These entrepreneurs have traditionally looked at the US market as their preferred destination for a multitude of reasons. The US offers not only a large consumer market, but also an extended availability of specialized inputs, investors, and potential acquirers. Many Israeli entrepreneurs have moved to the US over time, especially to the West Coast and, more recently, to New York. In doing so, they have progressively developed their own entrepreneurial network in the US, which has further stimulated Israeli migration to this country.
Although Israeli entrepreneurs are in general attracted by the US market, some of them run companies for which establishing headquarters in the US is intrinsically costly. These are companies operating in the defense sector and those developing stem cell, particularly embryonic stem cell, technologies. The defense sector has traditionally been characterized by high entry barriers (Adams and Adams, 1972) , which typically take the form of restrictions imposed both by the source country producing defense technologies and a potential destination economy. In particular, 6 to prevent the leakage of information on strategic technologies, the Israeli legislation establishes that the overseas transfer defense know-how is prohibited unless individuals obtain a defense export license -i.e., a license from the Director General of the Ministry of Defense or the Head of the Defense Export Control Agency. 6 Likewise, the US has enforced a number of restrictions on the import of defense goods, 7 to support the domestic development of such a strategic sector.
Altogether, these restrictions make it very costly for Israeli startups operating in the defense sector to penetrate the US. Regarding startups developing embryonic stem cell technologies, the Bush administration introduced restrictions on research conducted with embryonic stem cells in August of 2001, imposing severe limitations on federal funding (Holden and Vogel, 2009; Furman et al., 2012) . These restrictions have substantially increased the opportunity costs of migrating to the US, especially given that the Israeli government admits and subsidizes the creation of embryos for scientific purposes (Levine, 2008) .
Dataset
We build our dataset from Conti (2018) and extend it employing additional sources of information. 8 8 An earlier version of this dataset was used in Conti et al. (2013a) . 9 From the original dataset in Conti (2018), we dropped 9 startups that were founded in earlier years and for which migration information is not available, 2 startups that our information sources suggest had moved at ages -2 and -3, and 93 startups that moved to the US after three years of their inception. 
Migration data
Building on Guzman (2018), we use business registration records from the US states, complemented with secondary sources of information, to determine whether Israeli startups established their headquarters in the US. As described in Guzman (2018), business registration records are public records created when a firm is registered as a corporation, partnership, or limited liability company with the Secretary of State (or Secretary of the Commonwealth) of any US state. 12 We 10 IVC classifies institutional investors into: VCs, private equity firms, investment banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and advisory & management companies. While many non-VC investors manage venture capital funds or funds of similar nature, we take a conservative position and exclude them from our category of VCs.
11 Exit values are available only for 373 of the 494 acquired companies. 12 Other studies have used these data, including Guzman and Stern (2016) and Guzman and Stern (2017 Panel A of Figure 1 shows the distribution of migrants by the calendar year in which they moved to the US. More than half of the migrants (61 percent) established their headquarters within the first 3 calendar years of their inception, with the remaining being scattered across the following years. We further restrict our definition of entrepreneurial migrants considering only those that moved within three years of being founded. As a result, we remove 102 startups from the sample.
Though this cutoff of three years is admittedly ad hoc, we adopt it because we are specifically interested in location choices startups make during their earliest years. Our results are robust to adopting different cutoffs. We further remove two startups that the data suggest moved at ages -2 and -3, but keep three startups that moved at age -1. The clustering of migrants in their early years is consistent with US evidence provided in Guzman (2018). Not surprisingly, Panel B of Figure 1 reports that a large portion of migrants (53 percent) established their headquarters in California, a destination that matches well with Israel's comparative advantage in ICT industries. 
The selection of Israeli startups into migration
We begin our empirical analysis by examining the differences across Israeli startups in their likelihood of migrating to the US. This investigation allows us to gain insight into the types of startups that self-select into migration and will help guide the implementation of a machine learning algorithm for predicting the likelihood of migrating to the US. Our ultimate goal is to address selection concerns in analyzing the causal effects of migration.
We initially estimate a logit model relating our observables to the likelihood of migrating to the US. Among the observables, those that are time-varying are measured either during a startup's founding year or close to that date. The results are presented in Table 2 , which reports incidence rate ratios (IRRs) and standard errors clustered at the founding-year level. This clustering criterion is justified on the basis that the attractiveness of the US for Israeli startups may have changed over time. In column (1), we assess the relation between the amount of financing a startup raised during its first round and the likelihood of migrating to the US. As shown, the IRR is 3.33, suggesting that a one log-point increase in the amount of funds raised is associated with a 233% increment in the likelihood of migrating. The predictive power of this variable is remarkably high, producing a pseudo R 2 of 0.13. To the extent that a startup's initial financing is indicative of future performance, then this result suggests strong positive sorting.
In column (2), we introduce a measure related to the founders' human capital, that is, the number of successful startups they established in the past (Gompers et al., 2010) . The results
show that an additional successful startup is associated with a 46% increase in the likelihood of migrating to the US. The pseudo R 2 , 0.02, is considerably lower than the 0.13 figure reported at the bottom of column (1), suggesting that the predictive power of this variable is not as high as that of a startup's first financing round size.
Column (3) examines the following two measures: i) an indicator for whether a company had applied for at least one US-granted patent within one year of being founded and ii) a dummy taking value one if a startup had applied for at least one trademark with the USPTO and zero otherwise during the same time frame. As shown, startups with at least one successful patent application and those with at least one trademark application are 62% and 179% more likely to migrate to the US, respectively. Despite the significance of these effects, we again note that the predictive power of the two variables is limited in comparison with that of a startup's financing round size. The pseudo R 2 is 0.02 (column (3)) which, again, is a considerably smaller figure than the one reported at the bottom of column (1). 13 In column (4), we include all the observables discussed above, also adding sector and foundingyear fixed effects. The impact on migration of the funding amount a startup received remains approximately unchanged and highly significant relative to the magnitude reported in column (1).
In contrast, the IRRs associated with the patent and trademark measures are no longer statistically significant. This last result should not be surprising given that VCs have been found to invest in startups possessing intellectual property rights (Conti et al., 2013b; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013; Catalini et al., 2018) . It is also important to highlight that there is substantial variation in the likelihood of migrating depending on the sector to which a startup belongs. In particular, startups operating in IT and software are the most likely to migrate to the US. Using these companies as a reference outcome, we find that the likelihood of migrating is 79%, 60%, 69%, 85%, and 97% lower for startups operating in cleantech, communication, the life sciences, medical devices, and hardware sectors, respectively. We do not find any significant difference between startups operating in semiconductors and the internet and those in the IT and software sector with regards to their likelihood of moving. Overall, these sector-specific results reflect the specialization of both
Israel and the US in ICT sectors.
Finally, in column (5), we include an indicator variable identifying those startups that had raised funding from a US VC during their first round. By introducing this variable, we assess whether investor origins play a role in the startup's choice of migrating to the US. As shown, the IRR is 3.9, suggesting that startups supported by US VCs are 2.9 times more likely to move to the US than the remaining companies. While this effect is large and highly-significant, the coefficients of the remaining variables only change slightly, suggesting that the information embedded in the US VC indicator only partially overlaps with that conveyed by the other variables. In line with this conjecture, a likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the explanatory power of the model in column (5) is the same as that of the model reported in column (4), with a p-value of 0.00.
A machine learning model for predicting the likelihood of migrating
Building on the insights above, we develop a machine learning model to extract the largest information from the available observables and ultimately predict the likelihood of migration. To implement this model, we initially compile a list of covariates including the startup selection characteristics discussed above as well as additional variables reported in Table 1 . The additional variables are: an indicator identifying startups founded by university professors; the squared term of the funding amount startups raised in their first round; the number of VCs, corporate VCs, angel groups, private investors, insurance companies, investment banks, private equity firms, and pension funds investing in a startup's first round; the number of Israeli, US, and other foreign investors, as well as the number of Israeli, US, and other foreign VCs participating in a startup's first round.
We also employ detailed information extracted from the startup patents, and in particular consider the number of patents startups applied for within one year of their inception, the total number of inventors recorded in these patents, as well as the number of Israeli and foreign inventors.
Once this list is generated, we create two-way interactions among all the observables to account for the possibility that their relationship with the migration outcome is either non-linear or contingent on certain startup characteristics. Finally, we construct fixed effects for each of the investors participating in a startup's first round of financing. In doing so, we address the possibility that differences in individual investors' characteristics or the strategies they envisage for their portfolio startups may drive the selection into migration.
Having expanded our initial dataset along these directions, we generate 1,882 variables. As a final step, we prune the observables by implementing a variable regularization algorithm. This approach consists of retaining only those explanatory variables that have the largest predictive power in a LASSO regression for the startup choice of migrating (Tibshirani, 1996) . 14 Such a procedure leads us to maintain 149 out of the original 1,882 variables.
We employ this set of variables in a random subsample of our data, which retains 60% of the initial observations (N=1,315), to train a random forest model. Table A1 shows the top 50 variables by their "factor importance", which reflects the variables' predictive power. Note that the factor importance does not provide any information on the direction of the relationship between a given covariate and the likelihood of migrating. It only informs about the predictive power of such a covariate. The results in Table A1 provide some interesting insights. First, individual investor fixed effects are strong predictors of a startup's likelihood of migrating, as demonstrated by their high incidence in the list of variables. This result suggests that investors play an important role in either selecting startups with a high ex-ante likelihood of migrating or inducing their investee startups to migrate. Second, the interaction terms between our observables appear to be more relevant predictors than the observables themselves. This finding suggests that the startup choice to migrate is the result of a complex interaction of company, investor, and founder characteristics.
Finally, it is noteworthy that none of the founding-year fixed effects is listed in Table A1 . While the attractiveness of the US for Israeli startups might have changed over time, this variation seems to be captured by our other observables.
We test the performance of our model by examining the Receiver-Operating-Characteristic (ROC) score -that is, the rate at which the model effectively predicts true rather than false positives. Larger values of this score are associated with higher chances that the model will correctly classify each startup as either migrant or non-migrant. In particular, we compute the ROC score for the 40% (N=877) observations we had initially excluded from the training of the random forest.
We then repeat this train/test procedure 49 times with newly extracted random samples (without replacement) of the same size as the original one. The aim is to assess the out-of-sample predictive power of the model. The results are encouraging. As shown in Figure 5 , both the median and the mode ROC scores are equal to 0.85; a large value on a scale from 0.5 (completely uninformative 14 LASSO stands for Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator.
13 model) to one (fully informative model).
Having estimated the likelihood of migrating to the US, we graphically assess whether the US and Israel share a similar rank ordering of performance. Figure 6 reports the share of startups that successfully exited via either an acquisition or an IPO over the percentile distribution of the predicted probability of migration, obtained from our machine learning model. In Panel A, we consider the entire sample of startups, while in Panel B we only examine the subsample of nonmigrants. As shown, startups with a high-predicted probability of migrating are more likely to exit successfully, regardless of whether they actually migrated to the US or not. This result not only confirms our earlier evidence regarding positive sorting into migration, but also indicates that the determinants of startup performance in Israel are similar to those in the US.
Analyzing the sources of the US entrepreneurial ecosystem's comparative advantage
Having examined the factors determining sorting into migration, we now move on to estimate the migration benefits Israeli startups derive from establishing their headquarters in the US. We begin by outlining our empirical strategies, which exploit both cross-sectional and panel data. We then present the baseline empirical estimates obtained from each model. Finally, we explore the mechanisms through which startups derive gains from migrating to the US.
Empirical strategies
We plan to estimate the effect of migrating on the performance of those startups that choose to move to the US. Ideally, to identify migration effects on startup performance outcomes, we would estimate the treatment effect on treated companies, τ, which is defined as:
where Quasi-experiment using a plausibly exogenous control group of non-migrants. This approach consists of exploiting plausibly exogenous institutional constraints on the startups' ability to migrate. As we mentioned in Section 2, startups operating in the defense and embryonic stem cell domains incur larger costs to establish their headquarters in the US relative to other companies.
In particular, startups in the defense sectors face moving restrictions that are imposed by both the A possible concern with our empirical strategy is that Israeli founders may purposely avoid to commercialize certain technologies in order to circumvent the institutional constraints mentioned above. However, we note that the technologies that are commercialized in the defense sector are mostly the by-product of the intense training several Israeli founders received in elite army units.
These units not only provide highly specialized training, but also foster an environment conducive to the development of new technologies that are relevant for the Israeli defense needs. Given the context, it is unlikely that founders choose their startups' technologies conditioned by existing institutional constraints. In fact, the characteristics of these technologies are typically shaped by the type of specialized training the founders receive as well as the army needs. In the case of founders developing technologies in the embryonic stem cell field, the techniques used in embryonic stem cell research are highly specialized and differ in fundamental respects from the techniques employed, for instance, in adult stem cell research. Typically, founders learn these techniques during their graduate training at universities or other research institutions and it is unlikely that their decision to enroll in a specific graduate program is affected by the existence of US constraints of the funding of embryonic stem cell research.
Having built our control group, we employ a difference estimator in a sub-sample that only includes migrants and startups that cannot migrate for plausibly exogenous reasons. Defining S i as an indicator for whether a startup belongs to the control group of startups that cannot migrate, we estimate the treatment effect on the treated as follows:
whereτ is the propensity score-weighted estimator and p i is the propensity score, that is, the predicted probability of migrating obtained from the random forest model described in Section 4.
The distribution of p i for each group of treated and control startups is presented in Figure A1 . The key assumption of equation (2) is that the exogenous composition of the control group is orthogonal to a startup's performance outcomes, conditional on p i . Under this assumption, the performance of the control group represents an accurate estimate of the migrants' performance, had they kept their headquarters in Israel. In reporting our results, we restrict the sample to those treated and control startups (N=107) that are in the region of common support, which is displayed in Figure A1 .
Double LASSO on high-dimensional data. Our second approach consists of implementing a machine learning algorithm to address selection bias through an efficient utilization of the ob- context, the first step involves the selection of covariates that predict the likelihood of migrating to the US, while the second step requires the identification of the covariates that predict startup performance outcomes. The union of the explanatory variables selected from each step ultimately defines the set of controls employed in the outcome regression equations. The first step, which we described in Section 4, led us to select 149 of the 1,882 high-dimensional covariates derived from expanding our initial set of observables. The high ROC scores obtained from the random forest model predicting the likelihood of migrating suggest that we are explaining a large portion of Israeli startup selection into migration. Since we examine multiple startup performance outcomes, we repeat the second step of the double-LASSO procedure as many times as the number of performance outcomes we consider.
Panel Regressions. As a final approach, we exploit within-migrant variation of performance outcomes over time by estimating the following regression for each startup i of age t moving at age m:
where β t is the coefficient of interest. Moreover, α t denotes age fixed effects, γ i,m designates age of migration fixed effects, D i,t is an indicator taking on value 1 if an Israeli startup had its headquarters in the US at age t (and zero otherwise), λ i are startup fixed effects, and ε i,t,m is a random noise.
Contrary to our cross-sectional approaches, the inclusion of startup fixed effects implies that the relevant performance comparisons are carried within startup rather than across startups. The additional fixed-effects listed in equation (3) control for common factors that could influence startups established in the same year (through α t ) and migrating at the same stage of their life cycle (through γ i,m ). Therefore, the remaining variation stems from the different ages at which these companies move to the US.
Baseline results
Cross-sectional results. The cross-sectional migration effects on startup performance outcomes are displayed in Table 3 . We explore six outcome measures that closely map into the most relevant types of migration benefits startups could potentially derive by establishing their headquarters in the US. The first measure is an indicator for whether a startup applied for a trademark with the USPTO after t+1, where t is the founding year. This indicator captures startup gains from penetrating a market larger than the domestic economy. The second measure is the number of US granted patents startups applied for after t+1. This indicator captures the advantages of accessing innovation inputs and R&D spillovers localized in the US. The amount of VC raised after the first funding round proxies the gains Israeli startup migrants may derive from accessing a comparatively large supply of investors with deeper pockets. Finally, we consider the likelihood that a startup will be acquired and the likelihood it will go public via an IPO, as well as the transaction value in case of an acquisition. These three measures are proxies for the value startups could extract from their technologies after entering a relatively larger market for technology and ideas.
We estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for each outcome. Moreover, we report the results obtained from the following three estimation models. The first is a naïve model that only includes an indicator identifying startup migrants (Model I). The second model, Model II, compares the performance outcomes of migrants to those of a control group of startups that, as we mentioned in Section 5.1, could not move for plausibly exogenous reasons. We restrict the analysis to startups lying within the region of common support and control for the log-odds of the startups' predicted probability of moving to the US (p i ). 15 Finally, Model III refers to the double-LASSO model discussed in Section 5.1. To account for any correlation in the error terms within founding year and sector, we double-cluster standard errors by founding year and sector.
We describe the results for each startup performance outcome in turn. Column (1) reports the results for the effect of migrating on the likelihood that a startup will apply for a trademark registration with the USPTO. According to the naïve model, migrants are 34 percentage points more likely to apply for a trademark registration with the USPTO ex-post than non migrants; the coefficient being significant at the 1% level. The migration effect declines to 26 percentage points when we examine our quasi-experimental sample, although it remains highly significant.
Finally, the double-LASSO model predicts that migrating to the US translates into a 22 percentage point increased likelihood of applying for a trademark registration with the USPTO. These results suggest that Israeli startups migrating to the US derive sizeable gains from accessing a relatively large consumer market.
Column (2) of Table 3 displays the migration effects on startup patent output. The naïve model predicts positive migration effects on the number of US patents that startups apply for. However, the magnitude of the effect declines by approximately 70% and is no longer significant with our quasi-experimental sample and the double-LASSO specification. This is a remarkable result as it suggests that Israeli migrants do not derive significant benefits from accessing innovation inputs and R&D spillovers localized in the US. This finding should be interpreted in light of the fact that
Israel hosts a large supply of highly-skilled individuals, which diminishes the relative importance of achieving innovation productivity gains as a reason for moving to the US.
Column (3) presents the effects of migrating to the US on the amount of VC funding startups receive. As expected, the naïve model considerably overestimates the effect of moving to the US.
However, after addressing selection concerns with the double-LASSO approach, we continue to find significant migration effects on the amount of VC financing. In particular, migrants raise approximately 108% more VC than non-migrants. In the quasi-experimental sample, the effect of migrating is not significantly different from zero.
The potential benefits of relocating to the US in terms of the amount of funds raised could reflect differences in the availability of financing opportunities in Israel and in the US. Alternatively, these gains could result from an intrinsic increase in the Israeli startups' productivity after they migrate, which makes them more attractive to potential investors. To help disentangle these two explanations, we estimate the effect of migrating on the amount of VC funding obtained, having specifically considered only those rounds led by one US VC investor. 16 If Israeli startups move to the US to take advantage of investor availability, then they should especially attract funding from US VCs rather than from VCs based in another country. As shown in column (4), migrants raise 63% more US VC than non-migrants in the quasi-experimental sample, while the double-LASSO estimate is 100%. The magnitudes of these effects are similar to or even larger than those reported in column (3), supporting the conjecture that Israeli startups migrating to the US derive positive gains from the comparatively large investor market of this country.
Finally, columns (5) to (8) of Table 3 display the results for the startups' exit outcomes. Column (5) reports the effects of migrating on the likelihood of exiting via an acquisition. Relative to nonmigrants, companies moving to the US are 38 and 16 percentage points more likely to be acquired, depending on whether we consider the quasi-experimental sample or estimate the double-LASSO model. Considering that 21% of the startups in our sample have been acquired, these effects are economically large. 17 We next explore whether the results we obtained are driven by the comparatively large US supply of acquirers or by an increase in startup productivity following migration. To shed light on this point, column (6) reports the effect of migrating to the US on the likelihood that a startup will be acquired by a non-US company. Mimicking our earlier reasoning, if the size of the US market for acquisitions were a relevant determinant of the Israeli startups' decision to migrate, Israeli migrants should be more likely to be acquired by US companies than by foreign ones. Consistent with this conjecture, the results in column (6) show that Israeli migrants are no more likely than non-migrants to be acquired by non-US companies. Column (7) reports the effects of migrating to the US on startup sales value upon acquisition. The estimates are sizable.
Relative to non-migrants, Israeli startups moving to the US experience a 182% and a 100% increase in sales value, depending of whether we follow the quasi-experimental sample or double-LASSO approach. Collectively, these results suggest that acquirers respond to Israeli startups migrating to the US along both the intensive (likelihood of acquiring) and extensive (sales price) margins.
Remarkably, we find that establishing headquarters in the US does not produce significant effects on the likelihood that a startup will go public via an IPO (column (8)). In Table A3 of the Appendix, we delve deeper into this finding by examining the effect of migrating on the likelihood that a startup will exit via an IPO, distinguishing between those IPOs that took place on the US stock exchanges and those that occurred on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE). The results presented in columns (2) and (3) show that Israeli migrants are no more likely to go public on the US stock exchanges than non-migrants. However, migrants are less likely than non-migrants to go public on TASE (column (3)). Collectively, these results provide an indication that startup migrants extract greater value from their technologies by accessing the relatively large US market for acquisitions than by going public on TASE.
The totality of these findings suggests that the US entrepreneurial ecosystem's comparative advantage arises from a multitude of sources producing sizeable gains for startups. The sources we identify are a large consumer market, the availability of investors, and a developed market for acquisitions. The insignificant migration effects we obtain on startup patent output do not imply that the availability of innovation inputs and R&D spillovers are irrelevant for the absolute advantage of the US entrepreneurial ecosystem. Rather, this finding suggests that such factors are not as important as others when specifically comparing the US to other innovative economies.
A possible criticism to this interpretation of our findings is that, rather than revealing the US entrepreneurial ecosystem's comparative advantage, they simply highlight the benefits Israeli startups derive from migrating, regardless of the destination location. To address this concern, we collected information on Israeli startup migration to Europe in order to assess whether the benefits Israeli migrants derive by establishing their headquarters in the US outweigh the benefits of moving to Europe. Remarkably, none of the startups in our sample established their headquarters in Europe and only 59 companies opened a branch in this region. We take this evidence as suggestive of the superior advantages the US entrepreneurial ecosystem offers relative to other ecosystems.
Panel Regressions. We now move on to discuss the panel regression results reported in Table   4 . We include startup fixed effects and exploit within-movers variation to assess the change in the migrants' performance after they establish their headquarters in the US. All our regressions also include startup-age fixed effects to account for life cycle effects, and age-of-migration fixed effects to account for potential differences in dynamics between earlier and later movers. An advantage of this model is that it controls for any time-invariant aspect of a startup, including the characteristics of the original founders, initial venture idea, location at founding, and inception period. We limit the sample to the first seven years of a startup's life cycle to focus on the initial, entrepreneurial stages of a startup, rather than on those follow-on, more consolidated stages.
We examine the same outcome variables as in Table 3 , except for a startup's exit amount in case of an acquisition, which cannot be analyzed in a panel format. A startup's trademark and patent outputs, as well as the amount of funds raised are cumulative since inception. Similarly, we examine the likelihood that a startup will have experienced an acquisition as well as the likelihood that the startup will have gone public via an IPO as of a given year. We double-cluster standard errors by founding year and sector in all regressions. Model I, in the upper part of Table 4 , uses an indicator (Has Moved) that takes on value 1 starting from the year in which a startup established its headquarters in the US and zero in the pre-migration period. Therefore, the coefficient of this indicator represents the average variation in performance that migrants experience after they establish their headquarters in the US. Model II, in the lower part of Table 4 , introduces interaction terms between the Has Moved indicator and startup age dummies. The coefficients of these interactions capture the effect of moving at a given age on startup performance outcomes.
Column (1) of Table 4 establishing their headquarters in the US do not derive significant innovation productivity gains, regardless of the age at which they move.
Columns (3) and (4) examine the cumulative amount of VC financing Israeli startups raised over time. Column (3) considers the totality of a startup's cumulative VC amount, while in col-
umn (4) we analyze the cumulative funding amount, taking into account only those rounds led by a US VC. Model I shows that a startup raises significantly larger financing amounts after migrating, regardless of whether we cumulate all the round amounts (column (3)) or just those led by US VCs (column (4)). The results from Model I indicate that, after migrating, startups receive on average 31% more financing and 42% more US VC financing. Remarkably, the results from
Model II reported in column (3) suggest that these migration effects are relatively smaller during a startup's inception, accelerate later on, and finally decline after age 2, although they generally remain statistically significant. Regarding the cumulative funding raised from US VCs (column (4)), the magnitudes of the migration effects increase with a startup's age and remain large even during the company's later years. In general, these magnitudes are substantially larger than those reported in column (3) for the total cumulative amount of funding raised.
Columns (5) through (7) report the results for the startup equity outcomes. Column (5) presents the results for the likelihood that a startup will have been acquired by a given year. Upon establishing their headquarters in the US, Israeli migrants become on average 5 percentage points more likely to have exited via an acquisition (Model I). Consistent with the fact that the gains from moving gradually accumulate over time, Model II reports a slow and consistent increase in the probability that a startup will have experienced an acquisition as of a given year. By age 6, a startup migrant is 23 percentage points more likely to have exited through an acquisition. Column (6) reports the results for the likelihood that a startup will have been acquired by a non-US company. The point estimate derived from Model I is small in magnitude (0.003), suggesting again that acquisition gains from moving to the US predominantly depend on the availability of US acquirers.
The results from Model II support this conjecture. Indeed, the coefficients of the interactions between the Has Moved indicator and a startup's age dummies are all approximately zero and mostly insignificant. Finally, column (7) reports the results for the likelihood that a startup will have exited through an IPO by a given year. As shown, migrants are less likely to have experienced an IPO contingent on migrating, and this difference, which is rather small, is consistent through the various startup ages.
Overall, our panel analyses confirm the cross-sectional findings. Israeli startups migrating to the US derive significant gains in terms of penetrating a comparatively large consumer market, and accessing a wide availability of investors and potential acquirers. We continue to find that Israeli migrants do not significantly improve their innovation productivity and the likelihood of exiting via an IPO.
Exploring the mechanisms through which startups derive gains from
migrating to the US 5.3.1 Effects of migration on the structure of startup financing rounds Tables 3 and 4 reported that Israeli startups raise larger funding amounts upon migrating to the US.
This result could be explained by Israeli startups attracting a larger number of investors after they migrate. Alternatively, it could be driven by the fact that investors located in the US dispose of larger financial means than Israeli investors. We explore these conjectures in Table 5 , where we presents the estimates for the number of unique investors that have funded a given startup after its first round of financing, having controlled for the total funding amount the startup raises during the same period.
We show an interesting pattern. While the number of unique investors is positively correlated with migration (column (1)), the migration coefficient drops and becomes insignificantly different from zero, when we control for the amount of funding a startup raises (column (2)). However, when
we consider the number of US investors only (column (3)), the coefficient of migration remains positive and statistically significant, even after controlling for the amount of funding raised. In particular, upon migrating, Israeli startups increase their portfolio of US investors by 0.5. As shown in columns (4) and (5), this result is driven specifically by US VCs (column (4)) rather than by other types of US investors (column (5)). Finally, the results reported in column (6) reveal that startup migrants attract fewer non-US investors than non-migrants, all else being equal. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that migrants attract 0.7 fewer non-US investors than startups maintaining their headquarters in Israel. Collectively, the findings presented in Tables 3 to 5 suggest that Israeli migrants substitute non-US with US investors after they move and raise larger amounts of funding as a result.
Establishing headquarters in the US versus opening a branch office
In this section, we explore heterogeneity in migration effects by contrasting the Israeli startups' choice to establish their headquarters in the US with their decision to open a branch. Startups opening a branch office in the US should have a similar interest in the location benefits offered by the US as startups establishing their headquarters. 18 However, the level of effort they commit in migrating should be lower given that opening a branch overseas is not as costly as transferring headquarters. If the degree to which startups can appropriate location benefits is directly proportional to their migration effort, then we should expect the startups' migration mode to differentially affect their performance outcomes.
The results from our investigation are reported in Table 6 . We examine the same startup performance outcomes as those investigated in Table 3 , double-clustering standard errors by founding 18 These startups were originally excluded from our set of Israeli migrants.
year and sector. Column (1) reports the results for whether a startup has filed for a trademark with the USPTO after one year of being founded. As shown, the effect of establishing headquarters in the US is similar to that of opening a branch. Indeed, the estimates are close in magnitude (0.240 and 0.237), statistically equivalent, and are also similar to the main effect reported in Table   3 (0.220).
Column (2) displays the results for the rate of patenting. None of the coefficients associated with the different startup migration modes is significantly different from zero. This suggests that, regardless of whether Israeli startups establish their headquarters in the US or open a branch, they do not derive significant innovation productivity gains.
Columns (3) and (4) show the findings for the funding amount startups receive after their first financing round (column (3)) and the funding amount they specifically raise from US VCs (column (4)). The founding amount that Israeli startups with headquarters in the US raise is 37 percentage points larger than that of startups opening a branch. As reported in column (4), the difference in magnitudes becomes more pronounced when we only consider funding amounts raised from US VCs.
Columns (5) through (8) present the results for startups' equity outcomes. As shown, Israeli startups establishing their headquarters in the US are 11 percentage points more likely to be acquired than startups opening a US branch (column (5)) relative to the reference category of nonmigrants. As shown in column (6), this finding stems from acquisitions by US companies. In column (7), we assess the effect of each migration mode on a startup's acquisition value. We do so by restricting the analysis to those acquired startups for which we have data on their sales price.
The magnitude of the effects indicates that, among acquired startups, those with headquarters in the US sell at a higher price than those opening a US branch. The results for the likelihood of exiting through an IPO are reported in column (8). Here, we observe that startups opening a US branch are more likely to go public via an IPO than companies establishing their headquarters in the US relative to the reference category of non-movers.
These results suggest that the startups' level of commitment in migrating matters. While opening a US branch affords positive gains, these gains are generally not as large as those recorded for startups with US headquarters.
Migration benefits and destination locations within the US
We finally extend our heterogeneity analysis to examine whether there are any differences in migration benefits depending on the US location Israeli startups choose. In particular, we differentiate between the California (CA), Massachusetts (MA), and New York area (NY) destination locations, on the one hand, and the remaining US locations, on the other. We adopt this distinction because from the descriptive statistics provided in Figure 1 it appears that California, Massachusetts, and the New York area (i.e. includes New York and New Jersey) are Israeli startups' preferred lo-
cations. This geographical distribution should be related to the ICT specialization of the Israeli economy and the more recent investments it has made in the biotechnology sector. Indeed, California hosts the Silicon Valley ICT cluster, the Boston area and New Jersey are specialized in biotechnology, and New York hosts a vibrant e-commerce business environment. The scope of our analysis is to evaluate whether, by migrating to these geographical locations, Israeli startups indeed obtain greater gains than by moving elsewhere in the US.
The results are reported in Table 7 . We observe that there is no considerable difference in effects between migrating to CA/MA/NY and moving to other US destination locations, with respect to the following startup performance outcomes: the number of US granted patents filed-for (column (2)), and the likelihood of exiting via an acquisition or an IPO (columns (5), (6), and (8)). However, we observe a remarkable difference in effects when we specifically examine the likelihood startups register a trademark with the USPTO, the amount of funding startups raise, the amount they specifically obtain from US VCs, and the sales price at which they are sold. For instance, Israeli startups moving to New York area are 30 percentage point more likely to apply for a trademark than non-migrants, while startups moving to geographical areas different from CA/MA/NY are only 19 percentage point more likely. Furthermore, startups located in CA/MA/NY raise at least 110% more funds than non-migrants, while the percentage for startups located in other states is 67 (column (3)). This gap becomes wider when we only consider startup rounds led by US VCs (column (4)). Moreover, the price at which acquired startups are sold is at least 101% higher if they are located in CA/MA/NY, relative to non-migrants, and lower, though insignificantly different from zero, if they have headquarters in other US states (column (7)). Overall, these results suggest that while migrating to the US yields positive gains in general, several of these gains are 26 especially associated with the Israeli startups' most frequently chosen locations.
Concluding remarks
This paper uncovers underlying sources of the US entrepreneurial ecosystem's comparative advantage using a rich dataset of Israeli startups and estimating the benefits these companies derive from moving to the US. Israel is an attractive empirical context given that this country has historically built strong ties with the US and its entrepreneurs consider the US market as the preferred destination for their technologies. We begin by documenting that Israeli startups exhibiting a high predicted likelihood of migrating to the US are relatively more successful, regardless of whether they actually move or not. This result indicates that there is positive sorting into migration. Furthermore, it suggests that the rank orders of performance in Israel and in the US are comparable; a fundamental condition for the identification of migration effects on startup performance outcomes.
We adopt a number of complementary approaches to address the endogeneity of Israeli startups' migration choices, which all deliver consistent results. We initially compare the outcomes of migrants to those of startups that, for plausibly exogenous reasons, find it costly or cannot migrate. We augment this approach with a machine learning algorithm to better address the nonrandomness of selection into migration. We next estimate a double-LASSO regression. Finally, we exploit within-mover variation of performance outcomes and assess the effect of moving to the US in any given year. Throughout these approaches, we show that migrants are significantly more likely than non-migrants to have a trademark registered in the US. They are also more likely to raise VC funds and to be acquired. Moreover, conditional on experiencing an acquisition, startups achieve a higher transaction value. These effects are not only statistically significant but also economically important. Remarkably, we do not find any significant migration effect on the number of patents startups produce, suggesting that improving innovation productivity is not the Israeli startups' main reason for moving to the US.
Finally, we explore heterogeneity in startup responses to migration. In doing so, we show that the effects of migrating to the US on the amount of VC financing Israeli companies receive and the value at which they are sold are especially strong when Israeli startups establish their headquarters rather than when they open a subsidiary in the US. Additionally, we find that California, Massachusetts, and the New York area, which are the Israeli startups' most frequently chosen lo-27 cations, indeed offer superior performance gains deriving from the large availability of investors and a developed market for acquisitions. Collectively, these findings suggest heterogeneity in the benefits Israeli startups derive from moving to the US depending on their committed investment into migration and their location choice within the US.
The results presented in this paper lead us to conclude that, compared to other economies, the US entrepreneurial ecosystem offers a multiplicity of advantages which generate sizeable gains for startups. The advantages we identify are a large consumer market, the availability of investors, and a developed market for acquisitions. In contrast, innovation inputs and R&D spillovers are not as important when specifically comparing the US to other innovative economies, such as Israel.
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January 30, 2019 Notes: Descriptive statistics for the observables of our sample startups. The word "initial" refers to a startups founding year (t) and the year after (t+1 ). The word "final" refers to the years following t+1 and up to 2016. Notes: We report the results from estimating logit models for the likelihood that an Israeli startup establishes its headquarters in the US. The regressors of interest are measures for the performance potential of a startup. We report incidence-rate ratios (IRRs). Ratios greater than one imply that an increase in the value of a given regressor leads to a higher likelihood that an outcome occurs, with the opposite for ratios less than one. Standard errors are clustered at the founding-year level to account for the possibility that the attractiveness of the US market to Israeli startups might have changed over time. Significance denoted as: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. 
Distribution of 50 ROC Predictions
Notes: This figure assesses the performance of our machine learning model described in Section 4. We plot the distribution of the ROC scores derived from 50 random forest models, each trained with a random sample of 60% of the data (1,315 observations). Both the median and the mode ROC scores are equal to 0.85; a large value on a scale from 0.5 (completely uninformative model) to one (fully informative model). Notes: This figure examines the phenomenon of startup selection into migration. The x -axis reports the percentile distribution of the predicted probability of migration obtained from the machine learning model described in Section 4. As shown in Panel A, startups that are more likely to migrate are also better performers, in terms of their likelihood of exiting through an acquisition or an IPO. We find the same pattern in Panel B, which specifically considers the sub-sample of non-migrants, indicating that there is positive sorting into migration. The effect of moving to the US on Israeli startups' performance outcomes: Cross sectional results Notes: This table reports the estimates for the impact of migrating on startup performance. We examine six performance outcomes. The first measure is an indicator for whether a startup applied for a trademark with the USPTO after t+1, where t is the startup's founding year (column (1)). The second measure is the number of US granted patents a startup applied for, again after t+1 (column (2)). The third and fourth outcomes are the amount of VC raised after the first financing round (column (3)) and the amount of US VC raised during the same period (column (4)), respectively. The last outcomes are the likelihood that a startup is acquired (column (5)), the likelihood it is acquired by a non-US company (column (6)), a startups sales value (column (7)), and the likelihood it exits through an IPO (column (8)). Model I is the naive model described in the text. Model II is our quasi-experiment that uses a plausibly exogenous control group of non-migrants. Model III is the double-LASSO (Belloni et al., 2014) model. Standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered at founding year and sector levels. Significance denoted as: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. The effect of moving to the US on Israeli startups' performance outcomes: Within-migrant variation Notes: This table reports the estimates for the impact of migrating on startup performance, exploiting within-migrant variation. We examine the same outcome variables as in Table 3 , except for a startups exit amount in case of an acquisition, which cannot be analyzed in a panel format. A startup's trademark (column (1)) and patent output (column (2)), as well as the amount of funding raised (columns (3) and (4)) are cumulative since founding. Columns (5) and (6) examine the likelihood that a startup will have experienced an acquisition (column V) and the likelihood that the startup will have exited via an IPO (column (6)) as of a given year. All regressions include startup fixed effects, age fixed effects, and age at migration fixed effects. Model I uses an indicator (Has Moved ) that takes on value 1 starting from the year in which a startup established its headquarters in the US and zero in the pre-migration period. Model II introduces interaction terms between the indicator Has Moved and startup age dummies. Standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered at founding year and sector levels. Standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered at founding year and sector levels. Significance denoted as: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Notes: This table reports the effects of migrating on the number of unique investors participating in the startups' financing rounds (starting from the second round), having controlled for the total amount of funding raised. We present the results from the double-LASSO models. In columns (1) and (2), we examine the total number of unique investors. In column (3), we consider as an outcome the number of US investors, while in column (4) we focus on the number of US VCs. In column (5), the outcome is the total number of US non-VC investors. In all regressions, we include fixed effects for the number of unique investors participating in the startups' first round of financing. Standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered at founding year and sector levels. Significance denoted as: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Notes: This table compares the performance of each mover type, the startup establishing its headquarters in the US and the one opening a branch, to that of non-migrants. We present the results from the double-LASSO models. We examine the same startup performance outcomes as those investigated in Table 3 . Standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered at founding year and sector levels. Significance denoted as: * p <.01, ** p <.05, *** p <.01. Notes: This table examines whether there are any differences in migration benefits depending on the US location Israeli startups choose. We differentiate between the California, New England, and New York area destination locations, on the one hand, and the remaining US locations, on the other. We adopt this distinction because from the descriptive statistics provided in Figure 1 it appears that California, Massachusetts, and New York area (i.e. New York and New Jersey) are Israeli startups' preferred locations. This geographical distribution should be related to the ICT specialization of the Israeli economy and the more recent investments it has made in the biotechnology sector. Indeed, California hosts the Silicon Valley ICT cluster, the Boston area is specialized in biotechnology, and New York area hosts a vibrant e-commerce business environment. The scope of our analysis is to evaluate whether, by migrating to these geographical locations, Israeli startups indeed obtain greater gains than by moving elsewhere in the US. We examine the same startup performance outcomes as those investigated in Table 3 . Standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered at founding year and sector levels. Significance denoted as: * p <.1, ** p <.05, *** p <.01.
